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T he question of the relationship (Complementarity?, Tension?, Mutual exclusion?) between universalism and particularism occupies a central 
place in the current political and theoretical agenda. Universal values are seen 
either as dead or -  at the very least -  as threatened. What is more important, 
the positive character of those values is no longer taken for granted. On the one 
hand, under the banner of multiculturalism, the classical values of the Enlight­
enment are under fire, and considered as little more than the cultural preserve 
of Western imperialism. On the other hand, the whole debate concerning the 
end of modernity, the assault on foundational ism in its various expressions, 
has tended to establish an essential link between the obsolete notion of a 
ground of history and society, and the actual contents which, from the Enlight­
enment onwards, have played that role of ground. It is important, however, to 
realize that these two debates have not advanced along symmetrical lines, that 
argumentative strategies have tended to move from one to the other in unex­
pected ways, and that many apparently paradoxical combinations have been 
shown to be possible. Thus, the so-called postmodern approaches can be seen 
as weakening the imperialist foundationalism of Western Enlightenment and 
opening the way to a more democratic cultural pluralism; but they can also be 
perceived as underpinning a notion of »weak« identity which is incompatible 
with the strong cultural attachments required by a »politics of authenticity«. 
And universal values can be seen as a strong assertion of the »ethnia of the 
West« (as in the later Husserl), but also as a way of fostering -  at least 
tendentially -  an attitude of respect and tolerance vis-à-vis cultural diversity.
It would certainly be a mistake to think that concepts such as »universal« and 
»particular« have exactly same meaning in both debates; but it would also be 
mistaken to assume that the continuous interaction of both debates has had no 
effect on the central categories of each. This interaction has given way to 
ambiguities and displacements of meaning which are - 1 think -  the source of a 
certain political productivity. It is to these displacements and interactions that I 
want to refer in this essay. My question, put in its simplest terms is the
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following: What happens with the categories of »universal« and »particular« 
once they become tools in the language games that shape contemporary 
politics? What is performed through them? What displacements of meaning 
are at the root of their current political productivity?
Multiculturalism
Let us take both debates successively and see the points in which each cuts 
across the central categories of the other. Multiculturalism, first. The question 
can be formulated in these terms: is a pure culture of difference possible, a 
pure particularism which does away entirely with any kind of universal prin­
ciple? There are various reasons to doubt that this is possible. In the first place, 
to assert a purely separate and differential identity is to assert that this identity 
is constituted through cultural pluralism and difference. The reference to the 
other is very much present as constitutive of my own identity. There is no way 
that a particular group living in a wider community can live a monadic 
existence -  on the contrary, part of the definition of its own identity is the 
construction of a complex and elaborated system of relations with other 
groups. And these relations will have to be regulated by norms and principles 
which transcend the particularism of any group. To assert, for instance, the 
right of all ethnic groups to cultural autonomy is to make an argumentative 
claim which can only be justified on universal grounds. The assertion of one's 
own particularity requires the appeal of something transcending it. The more 
particular a group is, the less it will be able to control the global communitarian 
terrain within which it operates, and the more universally grounded will have 
to be the justification of its claims.
But there is another reason why a politics of pure difference would be self- 
defeating. To assert one's own differential identity involves, as we have just 
argued, the inclusion in that identity of the other, as that from whom one 
delimits oneself. But it is easy to see that a fully achieved differential identity 
would involve the sanctioning of the existing status quo in the relation between 
groups. For an identity which is purely differential vis-à-vis other groups has 
to assert the identity of the other at the same time as its own and, as a result, 
cannot have identity claims in relation to those other groups. Let us suppose 
that a group has such claims -  for instance, the demand for equal opportunities 
in employment and education, or even the right to have confessional schools. 
As far as these claims are presented as rights that I share as a member of the 
community with all other groups, they presuppose that I am not simply 
different from the others but, in some fundamental respects, equal to them. If it 
is asserted that all particular groups have the right to the respect of their own 
particularity, this means that they are equal to each other in some respects.
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Only in a situation in which all groups were different from each other and in 
which none of them wanted to be anything other than what they are, the pure 
logic of difference would exclusively govern the relations between groups. In 
all other scenarios the logic of difference will be interrupted by a logic of 
equivalence and equality. It is not for nothing that a pure logic of difference -  
the notion of separate developments -  lies at the root of apartheid.
This is the reason why the struggle of any group that attempts to assert its own 
identity against a hostile environment is always confronted by two opposite 
but symmetrical dangers for which there is no logical solution, no square circle
-  only precarious and contingent attempts of mediation. If the group tries to 
assert its identity as is at that moment, as its location within the community at 
large defined by the system of exclusions dictated by the dominant groups, it 
condemns itself to a perpetually marginalized and ghettoized existence. Its 
cultural values can be easily retrieved as »folklore« by the establishment. If, 
on the other hand, it struggles to change its location within the community and 
to break with its situation of marginalization, it has to engage in plurality of 
political initiatives which take it beyond the limits defining its present identity
-  for instance, struggles within the existing institutions. As these institutions 
are, however, ideologically and culturally moulded by the dominant groups, 
the danger is that the differential identity of the struggling group will be lost. 
Whether the new groups will manage to transform the institutions, or whether 
the logic of the institutions will manage to dilute -  via cooptation -  the identity 
of those groups is something which, of course, is not decided beforehand and 
depends on a hegemonic struggle. But what is certain is that is no major 
historical change in which the identity of all intervening forces is not trans­
formed. There is no possibility of victory in terms of an already acquired  
cultural authenticity. The increasing awareness of this fact explains the cen­
trality of the concept of »hybridization« in contemporary debates.
If we look for example of the early emergence of this alternative in European 
history, we can refer to the opposition between social-democrats and revolu­
tionary syndicalists in the decades preceding the First World War. The classi­
cal Marxist solution to the problem of the disadjustment between the particu­
larism of the working class and the universality of the task of socialist transfor­
mation, had been the assumption of an increasing simplification of the social 
structure under capitalism: as a result, the working class as a homogeneous 
subject, would embrace the vast majority of the population and could take up 
the task of universal transformation. With this type of prognostic discredited at 
the turn of the century, two possible solutions remained open. Either to accept 
a dispersion of democratic struggles only loosely unified by a semi-corpora­
tive working class, or to foster a politics of pure identity by a working class
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unified through revolutionary violence. The first road led to what has been 
depicted as social-democratic integration: the working class was coopted by a 
State in whose management it participated but whose mechanisms it could not 
master. The second road led to working class segregationism through violence 
and the rejection of all participation in democratic institutions. It is important 
to realize that the myth of the general strike in Sorel was not a device to keep a 
purely working class identity as a condition for a revolutionary victory. As the 
revolutionary strike was a regulatory idea rather than an actual possible event, 
it was not a real strategy for the seizure of power: its function was exhausted in 
being a mechanism endlessly recreating the workers separate identity. In the 
option between a politics of identity and the transformation of the relations of 
force between groups, Sorelianism can be seen as an extreme form of 
unilateralization of the first alternative.
If we renounce, however, to a unilateral solution, then the tension between 
these two contradictory extremes cannot be eradicated: it is there to stay, and 
the strategic calculation can only consist of the pragmatic negotiation between 
them. Hybridization is not a marginal phenomenon but the very terrain in 
which contemporary political identities are constructed. Let us just consider a 
formula such as »strategic essentialism« which has be much used lately. For a 
variety of reasons, I am not entirely satisfied with it, but it has the advantage of 
bringing to the fore the antinomic alternatives to which we have been referring 
and the need for a politically negotiated equilibrium between them. »Essential­
ism« alludes to a string identity politics, without which there can be no bases 
for political calculation and action. But that essentialism is only strategic -  i.e. 
it points out, at the very moment of its constitution, to its own contingency and 
its own limits.
This contingency is central to understanding what is perhaps the most promi­
nent feature of contemporary politics: the full recognition of the limited and 
fragmented character of its historical agents. Modernity started with the aspi­
ration to a limitless historical actor, who would be able to ensure the fullness 
of a perfectly instituted social order. Whatever the road leading to that fullness
-  an »invisible hand« which hold together a multiplicity of disperse individual 
wills, or a universal class who would ensure a transparent and rational system 
of social relations -  it always implied that the agents of that historical transfor­
mation would be able to overcome all particularism and all limitation and 
bring about a society reconciled with itself. This is what, for modernity, true 
universality meant. The starting point of contemporary social and political 
struggles is, on the contrary, the strong assertion of their particularity, the 
conviction that none of them is capable, on its own, of bringing about the 
fullness of the community. But precisely because of that, as we have seen, this 
particularity cannot be constructed through a pure »politics of difference« but
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has to appeal, as the very condition of its own assertion, to universal prin­
ciples. The question that at this point arises is to what extent this universality is 
the same as the universality of modernity, to what extent the very idea of a 
fullness of society experiences, in this changed political and intellectual cli­
mate, a radical mutation that -  while maintaining the double reference to the 
universal and the particular -  entirely transforms the logic of their articulation. 
Before answering this question, however, we have to move to our second 
debate, that related to the critique of foundationalism.
Contexts and the critique o f foundationalism
Let us start our discussion with a very common proposition: that there is no 
truth or value independent of a context, that the validity of any statement is 
only contextually determined. In one sense, of course, this proposition is 
uncontroversial and a necessary corollary of the critique of foundationalism. 
To pass from it to assert the incommensurability of context and to draw from 
there an argument in defence of cultural pluralism seems to be only a logical 
move, and I am certainly not prepared to argue otherwise. There is, however, 
one difficulty that this whole reasoning does not contemplate, and it is the 
following: how to determine the limits of a context? Let us accept that all 
identity is a differential identity. In that case two consequences follow: (1) that 
as in a Saussurean system, each identity is what it is only through its differ­
ences with all the others; (2) that the context has to be a closed one -  if all 
identities depend on the differential system, unless the latter defines its own 
limits, no identity would be finally constituted. But nothing is more difficult -  
from a logical point of view -  than defining those limits. If we had a founda­
tional perspective we could appeal to an ultimate ground which would be the 
source of all differences; but if we are dealing with a true pluralism of 
differences, if the differences are constitutive, we cannot go, in the search for 
the systematic limits that define a context, beyond the differences themselves. 
Now, the only way of defining a context is, as we said, through its limits, and 
the only way of defining those limits is to point out what is beyond them. But 
what is beyond the limits can only be other differences, and in that case -  given 
the constitutive character of all differences -  it is impossible to establish if 
these new differences are internal or external to the context. The very possibil­
ity of a limit and, ergo, a context, is thus jeopardized.
As I have argued elsewhere' the only way out of this difficulty is to postulate a 
beyond which is not more difference but something which poses a threat (i.e.
1 See Laclau, Ernesto, »Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics« in The Lesser Evil and the 
greater Good, Edited by Jeffrey Weeks, Rivers Oram Press, London 1994.
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negates) to all the differences within that context -  or, better, that the context 
constitutes itself as such through the act of exclusion of something alien of a 
radical otherness. Now, this possibility has three consequences which are 
capital for our argument.
1) The first is that antagonism and exclusion are constitutive of all identity. 
Without limits through which a (non-dialectical) negativity is constructed we 
would have an indefinite dispersion of differences whose absence of system­
atic limits would make any differential identity impossible. But this very 
function of constitution differential identities through antagonistic limits is 
what, at the same time, destabilizes and subverts those differences. For it the 
limit puts an equal threat to all the differences, it makes them all equivalent to 
each other, interchangeable with each other as far as the limit is concerned. 
This already announces the possibility of a relative universalization through 
equivalential logic, which is not incompatible with a differential particularism, 
but is required by the very logic of the latter.
2) The system is what is required for the differential identities to be consti­
tuted, but the only thing -  exclusion -  which can constitute the system and this 
make possible those identities, is also what subverts them. (In deconstructive 
terms: the conditions of possibility of the system are also its conditions of 
impossibility). Contexts have to be internally subverted in order to become 
possible. The system (as in Lacan's object petit a) is that that the very logic of 
the context requires but which is however impossible. It is present, if you 
want, through its absence. But this means two things. First, that all differential 
identity will be constitutively split; it will be the crossing point between the 
logic of difference and the logic of equivalence. This will introduce into it a 
radical undecidability. Second, that the fullness and universality of society is 
unachievable, its need does not disappear: it will always show itself through 
the presence of its absence. Again, we see here announcing itself an intimate 
connection between the universal and the particular which does not consist, 
however, in the subsumption of the latter in the former.
3) Finally, if that impossible object -  the system -  cannot be represented but 
needs, however, to show itself within the field of representation, the means of 
that representation will be constitutively inadequate. Only the particulars are 
such means. As a result the systematicity of the system, the moment of its 
impossible totalization, will be symbolized by particulars which contingently 
assume such a representative function. This means firstly, that the particularity 
of the particular is subverted by this function of representing the universal, but 
secondly, that a certain particular, by making of its own particularity the 
signifying body of a universal representation comes to occupy -  within the 
system of differences as a whole -  a hegemonic role. This anticipates our main
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conclusion in a society (and this is finally the case of any society) in which its 
fullness -  the moment of its universality -  is unachievable, the relation 
between the universal and the particular is a hegemonic relation.
Let us see in more detail the logic of that relation. I will take as an example the 
»universalization« of the popular symbol of Peronism in the Argentina of the 
1960s and 1970s. After the coup of 1955 which overthrew the Peronist regime, 
Argentina entered a long period of institutional instability which lasted for 
over 20 years. Peronism and other popular organizations were proscribed, and 
the succession of military governments and fraudulent civilian regimes which 
occupied the government were clearly incapable of meeting the popular de­
mands of the masses through the existing institutional channels. So, there was 
a succession of regimes less and less representative and an accumulation of 
unfulfilled democratic demands. These demands were certainly particular 
ones and came from very different groups. The fact that all of them were 
rejected by the dominant regimes established an increasing relation of equiva­
lence between them. This equivalence, it is important to realize, did not 
express any essential a priori unity. On the contrary, its only ground was the 
rejection of all of them by the existing regimes. In terms of our previous 
terminology, their unification within a context or system of differences was 
the pure result of all of them being antagonized by the dominant sectors.
Now, as we have seen, this contextual unification of a system of differences 
can only take place at the price of weakening the purely differential identities, 
through the operation of a logic of equivalence which introduces a dimension 
of relative universality. In our example, people felt that through the differential 
particularity of their demands -  housing, union rights, level of wages, protec­
tion of national industry, etc. -  something equivalent present in all of them was 
expressed, which was the opposition to the regime. It is important to realize 
that this dimension of universality was not at odds with the particularism of the 
demands -  or even of the groups entering into the equivalential relation -  but 
grew out of it. A certain more universal perspective, which developed out of 
the inscription of particular demands in a wider popular language of resistance, 
was the result of the expansion of the equivalential logic. A pure particularism 
of the demands of the groups, which had entirely avoided the equivalential 
logic, would have only been possible if the regime had succeeded in dealing 
separately with the particular demands and had absorbed them in a 
»transformistic« way. But in any process of hegemonic decline, this 
transformistic absorption becomes impossible and the equivalential logic in­
terrupt the pure particularism of the individual democratic demands.
As we can see, this dimension of universality reached through equivalence is 
very different from the universality which results from an underlying essence
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or an unconditioned a priori principle. It is not either a regulative idea -  
empirically unreachable but with an unequivocal teleological content -  be­
cause it cannot exist apart from the system of equivalences from which it 
proceeds. But this has important consequences for both the content and the 
function of that universality. We have seen before that the moment of totalization 
or universalization of the community -  the moment of its fullness -  is an 
impossible object which can only acquire a discursive presence through a 
particular content which divests itself of its particularity in order to represent 
that fullness. To return to our Argentinian example, this was precisely the role 
that, in the 1960s and 70s, was played by the popular symbols of Peronism. As 
I said earlier, the country had entered into a rapid process of de-institutional- 
ization, so the equivalential logic could operate freely. The Peronist movement 
itself lacked a real organization and was rather a series of symbols and a loose 
language unifying a variety of political initiatives. Finally, Peron himself was 
in exile in Madrid, intervening only in a distant way in his movement's actions, 
being very careful not to take any definitive stand in the fractional struggles 
within Peronism. In those circumstances, he was in the ideal conditions to 
become the »empty signifier« incarnating the moment of universality in the 
chain of equivalences which unified the popular camp. And the ulterior des­
tiny of Peronism in the 1970s clearly illustrates the essential ambiguity inher­
ent in any hegemonic process: on the one hand, the fact that the symbols of a 
particular group assume at some point a function of universal representation 
gives certainly a hegemonic power to that group; but, on the other hand, the 
fact that that function of universal representation has been acquired at the price 
of weakening the differential particularism of the original identity, leads 
necessarily to the conclusion that this hegemony is going to be precarious that 
threatened. The wild logic of emptying the signifiers of universality through 
the expansion of the equivalential chains means that no fixing and particular 
limitation of the sliding of the signified under the signifier is going to be 
permanently assured. This is what happened to Peronism after the electoral 
victory of 1973 and Peron's return to Argentina. Peron was no longer an empty 
signifier but the President of the country, who had to carry out concrete 
politics. Yet the chains of equivalences constructed by the different factions of 
his movements had gone beyond any possibility of control -  not even by Peron 
himself. The result was the bloody process which led to the military dictator­
ship in 1976.
The previous developments lead us to the following conclusion: the dimension 
of universality -  resulting from the incompletion of all differential identities -  
cannot be eliminated as far as a community is not entirely homogeneous (if it 
was homogeneous, what would disappear is not only universality but also the 
very distinction universality/particularity). This dimension is, however, just an
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empty place unifying a set of equivalential demands. We have to determine the 
nature of this place both in terms of its contents and of its function. As far as 
the content is concerned it does not have a content of its own but just that 
which is given to it by a transient articulation of equivalential demands. There 
is a paradox implicit in the formulation of universal principles, which is that all 
of them have to present themselves as valid without exception, while, even its 
own terms, this universality can be easily questioned and can never be actually 
maintained. Let us take a universal principle such as the right of nations to 
self-determination. As a universal right, it claims to be valid in any circum­
stance. Let us suppose now that within a nation genocidal practices are taking 
place: in that case has the international community the duty to intervene, or is 
the principle of self-determination unconditionally valid. The paradox is that 
the principle has to be formulated as universally valid and however there are 
always to be exceptions to that universal validity. But perhaps the paradox 
proceeds from believing that this universality has a content of its own, whose 
logical implications can be analytically deduced, without realizing that its only 
function -  within a particular language game -  is to make discursively possible 
a chain of equivalential effects, but without pretending that this universality 
can operate beyond the context of its emergence. There are innumerable 
contexts in which the principle of national self-determination is a perfectly 
valid way of totalizing and universalizing a historical experience.
But in that case, if we always know beforehand that no universalization will 
live up to its task, if it will always fail to deliver the goods, why does the 
equivalential aggregation have to express itself through the universal? The 
answer is to be found in what we said before about the formal structure on 
which the aggregation depends. The »something identical« shared by all the 
terms of the equivalential chain -  that which makes the equivalence possible -  
cannot be something positive (i.e. one more difference which could be defined 
in its particularity), but proceeds from the unifying effects that the external 
threat puts to an otherwise perfectly heterogeneous set of differences (particu­
larities). The »something identical« can only be the pure, abstract, absent 
fullness of the community, which lacks, as we have seen, any direct form of 
representation and expresses itself through the equivalence of the differential 
terms. But, in that case, it is essential that the chain of equivalences remains 
open: otherwise its closure could only be the result of one more difference 
specifiable in its particularity and we would not be confronted with the 
fullness of the community as an absence. But in that case, the open character of 
the chain means that what is expressed through it has be universal and not 
particular. Now, this universality needs -  for its expression -  to be incarnated 
in something essentially incommensurable with it: a particularity (as in our 
example of the right to national self-determination). This is the source of the
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tension and ambiguities surrounding all these so-called »universal« principles: 
all of them have to be formulated as limitless principles, expressing a univer­
sality transcending them; but they all, for essential reasons, sooner or later 
become entangled in their own contextual particularism and are incapable of 
fulfilling their universal function.
As far as the function (as different from the content) of the »universal«, we 
have said enough to make clear what it consists of: it is exhausted in introduc­
ing chains of equivalence in an otherwise purely differential world. This is the 
moment of hegemonic aggregation and articulation and can operate in two 
ways. The first is to inscribe particular identities and demands as links in a 
wider chain of equivalences, thereby giving each of them a »relative« univer­
salization. If, for instance, feminist demands enter into chains of equivalence 
with those of black groups, ethnic minorities, civil rights activist, etc., they 
acquire a more global perspective than in the case where they remain restricted 
to their own particularism. The second is to give a particular demand a 
function of universal representation -  that is, to give a particular demand the 
value of a horizon giving coherence to the chain of equivalences and, at the 
same time, keeping it indefinitely open. To give just a few examples: the 
socialization of the means of production was not considered as a narrow 
demand concerning the economy but as the »name« for a wide variety of 
equivalential effects irradiating over the whole society. The introduction of a 
market economy played a similar role in Eastern Europe after 1989. The return 
of Peron, in our Argentian example, was also conceived in the early 70s as the 
prelude to a much wider historical transformation. Which particular demand, 
or set of demands, are going to play this function of universal representation is 
something which cannot be determined by a priori reasons (if we could do so, 
this would mean that there is something in the particularity of the demand 
which predetermined it to fulfil that role, and that would be in contradiction of 
our whole argument).
We can return to the two debates which were the starting point of our reflexion. 
As we can see there are several points in which they interact and in which 
parallelism can be detected. We have said enough about multiculturalism for 
our argument concerning the limits of particularism to be clear. A pure 
particularistic stand is self-defeating because it has to provide a ground for the 
constitution of the differences as differences, and such a ground can only be a 
new version of an essentialist universalism. (If we have a system of differences 
A/B/C, etc. we have to account for this separation -  to be separated is also a 
form of relation between objects -  and I am again entangled as Leibniz knew 
well, in the positing of ground. The pre-established harmony of the monads is 
essential a ground as the Spinozean totality.) So, the only way out of this
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dilemma is to maintain the dimension of universality but to propose a different 
form of its articulation with the particular. This is what we have tried to 
provide in the preceeding pages through the notion of the universal as an 
empty but ineradicable place.
It is important, however, to realise that this type of articulation would be 
theoretically unthinkable if we did not introduce into the picture some of the 
central tenets of the contemporary critique of foundationalism (it would be 
unthinkable, for instance, in a Habermasian perspective). If meaning is fixed 
beforhand either in a strong sense, by a radical ground (a position that less and 
less people would sustain today) or, in a weaker version, through the regula­
tive principle of an undistorted communication, the very possibility of the 
ground as an empty place which is politically and contingently filled by a 
variety of social forces, disappears. Differences would not be constitutive 
because something previous to be their play already fixes the limit of their 
possible variation and establishes an external tribunal to judge them. Only the 
critique of a universality which is detennined in all its essential dimensions by 
the metaphysics of presence, opens the way for a theoretical apprehension of 
the notion of »articulation« that we are trying to elaborate -  as different from a 
purely impressionistic apprehension, in terms of a discourse structured through 
concepts which are perfectly incompatible with it. (We always have to remem­
ber Pascal's critique of those who think that they are already converted because 
they have just started thinking of getting converted.)
But if the debate concerning multiculturalism can draw clear advantages from 
the contemporary critique of foundationalism (broadly speaking, the whole 
range of intellectual developments embraced by labels such as »postmodernism« 
and »post-structuralism«), these advantages also work in the opposite direc­
tion. For the requirements of a politics based on a universality compatible with 
an increasing expansion of cultural differences, are clearly incompatible with 
some versions of postmodernism -  particularly those which conclude from the 
critique of foundationalism that there is an implosion of all meaning and the 
entry into a world of »simulation« (Baudrillard). I don't think that this is a 
conclusion which follows at all. As we have argued, the impossibility of a 
universal ground does not eliminate its need: it just transforms the ground into 
an empty place which can partially be filled in a variety of ways (the strategies 
of this filling is what politics is about). Let us go back for a moment to the 
question of contextualization. If we could have a »saturated« context we 
would indeed be confronted with a plurality of incommensurable spaces 
without any possible tribunal deciding between them. But, as we have seen, 
any such saturated context is impossible. Yet, the conclusion which follows 
from this verification is not that there is a formless dispersion of meaning
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without any possible kind of even a relative articulation but, rather, that 
whatever plays such an articulating role is not predetermined to it by the form 
of the dispersion as such. This means first that all articulation is contingent 
and, second, that the articulating moment as such is always going to be an 
empty place -  the various attempts at filling it being transient and submitted to 
contestation. As a result, at any historical moment, whatever dispersion of 
differences exists in society is going to be submitted to contradictory processes 
of contextualization and de-contextualization. For instance, those discourses 
attempting to close a context around certain principles or values, will be 
confronted and limited by discourses of rights, which try to limit the closure of 
any context. This is what makes so unconvincing the attempts by contempo­
rary new-Aristotelians such as McIntyre at accepting only the contextualizing 
dimension and closing society around a substantive vision of the common 
good. Contemporary social and political struggles open, I think, the strategies 
at filling the empty place of the common good. The ontological implications of 
the thought accompanying these »filling« strategies clarifies, in turn, the 
horizon of possibilities opened by the anti-foundationalist critique. It is to 
these strategic logic that I want to devote the rest of this essay.
We can start with some conclusions which could easily be derived from our 
previous analysis concerning the status of the universal. The first is that if the 
place of the universal is an empty one and there is no a priori reason for it not 
to be filled by any content, if the forces which fill that place are constitutively 
split between the concrete politics that they advocate and the ability of those 
politics to fill the empty place, the political language of any society whose 
degree of institutionalization has, to some extent, been shaken or undermined, 
will also be split. Let us just take a term such as »order« (social order). What 
are the conditions of its universalization? Simply, that the experience of a 
radical disorder makes any order preferable to the continuity of disorder. The 
experience of a lack, of an absence of fullness in social relations, transforms 
»order« into the signifier of an absent fullness. This explains the split we were 
referring to: any concrete politics, if it is capable of bringing about social 
order, will be judged not only according to its merits in the abstract, indepen­
dently of any circumstances, but mainly in terms of that ability to bring about 
»order« -  a name for the absent fullness of society. (»Change«, »revolution«, 
»unity of the people«, etc. are other signifiers which have historically played 
the same role.) As for essential reasons we have pointed out that fullness of 
society is unreachable, this split in the identity of political agents is an 
absolutely constitutive »ontological difference« -  in a sense not entirely unre­
lated to Heidegger's use of this expression. The universal is certainly empty 
and can only be filled, in different contexts, by concrete particulars. But, at the 
same time, it is absolutely essential for any kind of political interaction, for if
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the latter took place without universal reference, there would be no political 
interaction at all: we would only have either a complementary of difference 
which would be totally non-antagonistic, or a totally antagonistic one, one 
where differences entirely lack any commensurability, and whose only pos­
sible resolution is the mutual destruction of the adversaries.
Now, it is our contention that politico-philosophical reflexion since the ancient 
world has been largely conscious of this constitutive split, and has tried to 
provide various ways of dealing with it. These ways follow one or the other of 
the logical possibilities pointed out in the previous analysis. To suggest how 
this took place we will briefly refer to four moments in the politico-philosophi­
cal tradition of the West in which images of the ruler have emerged which 
combine in different ways universality and particularity. We will successively 
refer to Plato's philosopher-king, to Hobbes' sovereign, to Hegel's hereditary 
monarch and to Gramsci's hegemonic class.
In Plato the situation is unambiguous. There is no possible tension or antago­
nism between the universal and the particular. Far from being an empty place, 
the universal is the location of all possible meaning, and it absorbs within itself 
the particular. Now, there is for him, however, only one articulation of the 
particularities which actualize the essential form of the community. The uni­
versal is not »filled« from outside, but is the fullness of its own origin and 
express itself in all aspects of social organization. There can be here no 
»ontological difference« between the fullness of the community and its actual 
political and social arrangements. Only one kind of social arrangement, which 
extends itself to the most minute aspects of social life is compatible with the 
community in its last instance is. Other forms of social organization can, of 
course, factually exist, but they have not the status of alternative forms among 
which one has to choose according to the circumstances. They are just degen­
erate forms, pure corruption of being, derived from the obfuscation of the 
mind. As far as there is true knowledge only particular form of social organiza­
tion realizes the universal. And if ruling is a matter of knowledge and not of 
prudence, only the bearer of that knowledge, the philosopher, has the right to 
rule. Ergo: a philosopher-king.
In Hobbes we are apparently in the antipodes of Plato. Far from being the 
sovereign who has the knowledge of what the community is, before any 
political decision, his decisions are the only source of the social order. Hobbes 
is well aware of what we have called the »ontological difference«. As far as 
the anarchy of the state of nature threatens society with radical disorder, the 
unification of the will of the community in the will of the ruler (or rather, the 
will of the ruler as the only unified will that the community can have) will 
count as far as it imposes order, whatever the contents of the latter could be.
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Any order will be better than radical disorder. There is here something close to 
a complete indifference to the content of the social order imposed by the ruler, 
and an exclusive concentration of the function of the latter: ensuring order as 
such. »Order« becomes certainly an empty place, but there is in Hobbes no 
hegemonic theory about the transient forms of its filling: the sovereign, the 
»mortall God«, fill the empty place once and forever.
So, Plato and Hobbes are apparently at the antipodes of the theoretical spec­
trum. For Plato, the universal is the only full place; for Hobbes, it is an 
absolutely empty place which has to be filled by the will of the sovereign. But 
if we look more closely at the matter, we will see that this difference between 
them is overshadowed by what they actually share, which is not to allow the 
particular any dynamics of its own vis-à-vis the full/empty place of the 
universal. In the first case the particular has to actualize in its own body a 
universality transcending it; in the second case equally, although by artificial 
means, a particular has detached itself from the realm of particularities and has 
become the unchallengeable Law of the community.
For Hegel, the problem is posed in different terms. As for him the particular­
ism of each stage of social organization is Aufliebung at a higher level, the 
problem of the incommensurability between particular content and universal 
function cannot actually arise. But the problem of the empty place emerges in 
relation to the moment in which the community has to signify itself as a totality
-  i.e. the moment of its individuality. This signification is obtained, as we 
know, through the constitutional monarch, whose physical body represents a 
rational totality absolutely dissimilar to that body. (This representation, in 
Hegel, of something which has no content of its own through something else 
which is its exact reverse has been very often stressed by Slavoj Žižek, who 
has contributed several other examples such as the assertion, in the Phenom­
enology o f Spirit, that »the Spirit is a bone«.) But this relation by which a 
physical body, in its pure alienation of any spiritual content, can represent this 
last content, entirely depends on the community having reached, through 
successive sublation of its partial contents, the highest form of rationality 
achievable in its own sphere. For such a fully rational community no content 
can be added and it only remains, as a requirement for its completion, the 
signification of the achievement o f that functional rationality. Because of that, 
the rational monarch cannot be an elected monarch: he has to be a hereditary 
one. If he was elected, reasons would have to be given for that election, and 
this process of argumentation would mean that the rationality of society would 
not been achieved independently of the monarch, and that the latter would 
have to play a greater role than a pure function of ceremonial representation.
Finally Gramsci. The hegemonic class can only become such by linking a
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particular content to a universality transcending it. If we say -  as Gramsci did
-  that the task of the Italian working class if to fulfil the tasks of national 
unification that the Italian people had posed to itself since the time of Machiavelli 
and, in this way, to complete the historical project of the Risorgimento, we 
have a double order of reference. On the one hand, a concrete political 
programme -  that of the workers -  as different from those of other political 
forces; but, on the other hand, that programme -  i.e. that set of demands and 
political proposals -  is presented as a historical vehicle for a task transcending 
it: the unity of the Italian nation. Now, if this »unity of the Italian nation« was 
a concrete content, specifiable in a particular context, it could not be some­
thing which extended over a period of centuries and that different historical 
forces could bring about. If this, however can happen, it is because »unity of 
the Italian nation« is just the name or the symbol of a lack. Precisely because it 
is a constitutive lack, there is no content which is a priori destined to fill it, and 
it is open to the most diverse articulations. But this means that the »good« 
articulation, the one that would finally suture the link between universal task 
and concrete historical forces will never be found, and that all partial victory 
will always take place against the background of an ultimate and unsurpassable 
impossibility.
Viewed from this perspective the Gramscian project can be seen as a double 
displacement, vis-à-vis Hegel and vis-à-vis Hobbes. In one sense it is more 
Hobbesian than Hegelian, because, as society and State are less self-structures 
than in Hegel, they require a dimension of political constitution in which the 
representation of the unity of the community is not separated from its con­
struction. There is a remainder of particularity which cannot be eliminated 
from the representation of that unity (unity = individuality in the Hegelian 
sense). The presence of this remainder is what is specific to the hegemonic 
relation. The hegemonic class is somewhere in between the Hegelian monarch 
and the Leviathan. But it can equally be said that Gramsci is more Hegelian 
than Hobbesian, in the sense that the political moment in his analysis presup­
poses an image of social crises which is far less radical than in Hobbes. 
Gramsci's »organic crises« fall far short, in terms of their degrees of social 
structuration, from the Hobbesian state of nature. In some senses, the succes­
sion of hegemonic regimes can be seen as a series of »partial covenants« -  
partial because, as society is more structured than in Hobbes, people have 
more conditions to enter into the political covenant; but partial also because, as 
the result of that, they also have more reason to substitute the sovereign.
These last points allow us to go back to our earlier discussion concerning 
contemporary particularistic struggles and to inscribe it within the politico- 
philosophical tradition. In the same way that we have presented Gramsci's
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problematic through the displacements that he introduces vis-à-vis the two 
approaches that we have symbolized in Hobbes and Hegel, we could present 
the political alternatives open to multicultural struggled through similar dis­
placements vis-à-vis Gramsci's approach. The first and most obvious displace­
ment is to conceive a society which is more particularistic and fragmented and 
less amenable than Gramsci's to enter into unified hegemonic articulations. 
The second, is that the loci from which the articulation takes place -  for 
Gramsci they were locations such as the Party, or the State (in an expanded 
sense) -  are going to be also more plural and less likely to generate a chain of 
totalizing effects. What we have called the remainder of particularism inherent 
in any hegemonic centrality grows thicker but also more plural. Now, this has 
mixed effects from the viewpoint of a democratic politics. Let us imagine a 
jacobinical scenario. The public sphere is one, the place of power is one but 
empty, and a plurality of political forces can occupy the latter. In one sense we 
can say that this is an ideal situation for democracy, because the place of 
power is empty and we can conceive the democratic process as a partial 
articulation of the empty universality of the community and the particularism 
of the transient political forces incarnating it. This is true, but precisely 
because the universal place is empty, it can be occupied by any force, not 
necessarily democratic. As is well-known, this is one of the roots of contempo­
rary totalitarianism (Lefort).
If, on the contrary, the place of power is not unique, the remainder, as we said, 
will be weightier, and the possibility of constructing a common public sphere 
through a series of equivalential effects cutting across communities will be 
clearly less. This has ambiguous results. On the one hand, communities are 
certainly more protected in the sense that a jacobinical totalitarianism is less 
likely. But, on the other hand, for reasons that have been pointed our earlier, 
this also favours the maintenance of the status quo. We can perfectly well 
imagine a modified Hobbesian scenario in which the Law respects communi­
ties -  no longer individuals -  in their private sphere, while the main decision 
concerning the future of the community as a whole are the preserve of a neo- 
Leviathan -  for instance a quasi-omnipotent technocracy. To realize that this is 
not at all an unrealistic scenario, we only have to think of Samuel Huntington 
and, more generally, of contemporary corporatist approaches.
The other alternative is more complex but it is the only one. I think, compatible 
with a true democratic politics. It wholly accepts the plural and fragmented 
nature of contemporary societies, but, instead of remaining in this particularis­
tic moment, it tries to inscribe this plurality in equivalential logic which make 
possible the construction of new public spheres. Difference and particularism 
are the necessary starting point, but out of it, it is possible to open the way to a
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relative universalization of values which can be the basis for a popular hege­
mony. This universalization and its open character certainly condemns all 
identity to an unavoidable hybridization, but hybridization does not necessar­
ily mean decline through a loss of identity: it can also mean empowering 
existing identities through the opening a new possibilities. Only a conservative 
identity, closed on itself, could experience hybridization as a loss. But this 
democratico-hegemonic possibility has to recognize the constitutive 
contextualized/decontextualized terrain of its constitution and fully take ad­
vantage of the political possibilities that this undecidability opens.
All this finally amounts to saying is that the particular can only fully realize 
itself if it constantly keeps open, and constantly redefines, its relation to the 
universal.

